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Abstract
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Introduction

Security in computer systems is impodant so as to
ensure reliable operation and to protect the integrity
of stored information. Faults in the implementation
of critical components can be exploited to breach security and penetrate a system. These faults must he
identified, detected, and corrected to ensure reliability and safeguard against denial of service, unauthorized modification of data, or disclosure of information.

Security of computer systems is important 50 as to
maintain reliable operation and to protect the integrity and privacy of stored information.
In recent years we have seen the development. of
sophisticated vulnerability databases and vulnerability exploitation tools by the so-called "computer underground". Some of these tools are capable of automating the exploitation of vulnerabilities that were
thought to require considerable expertise, including
IP and DNS spoofing. These tools are freely and
widely available, and pose a significant threat that
cannot be ignored. The celebrated Kevin Mitnick
is an example of a vandal who used such tools and
databases to penetrate hundreds of computers before
being caught [17]. Although Mitnick was an expert
at exploiting VMS security holes, it is widely believed
that his knowledge of Unix was limited and that he
was provided, by a source unknown, with ready-made
tools of considerable complexity [30].

We define a classification of security faults in the
Unix operating system. We state the criteria used
to categorize the faults and present examples of the
different fault types.
We present the design and implementation details
of a prototype database to store vulnerability infor. mation collected from different sources. The data is
organized according to our fault categories. The information in the database can be applied in static
audit analysis of systems, intrusion detection, and
fault detection. We also identify and describe software testing methods that should be effective in detecting different faults in our classification scheme.

With the widespread use of computers, and increased computer knowledge in the hands of people
whose objective is to obtain access to unauthorized
systems and resources, it is no longer possible or desirable to implement security through obscurit.y [16].

"This paper lo be presenled allhe 19th National Information Systems Se.:urity Conference, October 22-25,1996, BaIlimore, Maryland.

To ensure that computer systems are secure against
malicious attacks we need to analyze and understand
the characteristics offaults that can subvert security
mechanisms. A classification scheme can aid in the
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understanding of faults that cause security breaches
by categorizing faults and grouping faults that share
common characteristics.

gories prevents fine-grain c1assificat.ion and can lead
to ambiguities, classifying the same fault in more
than one category.

Carl Landwehr et al. [24J published a collection of
security flaws in different operating systems and clas2 Related Work
sified each :flaw according to its genesis, or the time
it was introduced into the system, or the section of
Existing fault classification schemes are not suitable code where each flaw was introduced. The taxonomy
for data organization because they do not clearly proposed, unfortunately, is difficult to use for unamspecify the selection criteria used. This can lead to biguous classification because the categories are too
ambiguities and result in a fault being classified in generic and because it does not specify a clear classification criteria.
more than one category.
Brian Marick [25] published a survey of software
fault studies from the software engineering literature.
Most of the studies reported faults that were discovered in production quality software. Although the
results of the study are insightful, the classification
scheme provided is not suitable for data organization
and unambiguous classification.

The Protection Analysis (PA) Project conducted
research on protection errors in operating systems
during the mid-1970s. The group published a series
of papers, each of which described a specific type of
protection error and presented techniques for finding
those errors. The proposed detection techniques were
based on pattern-directed evaluation methods, and
used formalized patterns to search for corresponding
errors [13]. The results of the study were intended
for use by personnel working in the evaluation or enhancement of the security of operating systems [10].

Although classical software testing techniques are
not strictly concerned with a taxonomy of software
flaws, we must pay close attention to them because
fault classification schemes must classify faults detected using these methods.

The objective of this study was to enable anyone
with little or no knowledge about computer security
to discover security errors in the system by using the Boundary Condition Errors:
pattern-directed approach. However, these method
Boundary Value Analysis (BVA)can be used to
could not be automated easily and their database of
design test cases for functional testing of modfaults was never published. The final report of the
ules. BVA ensures that the test cases exercise the
PA project proposed four representative categories of
boundary conditions that can expose boundary
faults. These were designed to group faults based on
condition errors [26]. In addition to functional
their syntactic structure and are too broad to be used
testing, mutation testing can also be used to defor effective data organization.
tect boundary conditions by designing appropriate language dependent mutants [7, 12, 31, 14).
The RISaS project was a study of computer seDomain analysis can be applied to detect boundcurity and privacy conducted in the mid-1970s [6].
ary
condition errors. Domain analysis has been
The project was aimed at understanding security
studied
with two variables and examined with
problems in existing operating systems and to sugthree
variables
[19, 5]. The main disadvantage
gest ways to enhance their security. The systems
of
domain
testing
is that it can only be applied
whose security features were studied included IBM's
to
a
small
number
of variables as the difficulty
as/MVT, UNIVAC's 1100 Series operating system,
of
selecting
test
cases
becomes increasingly comand Bolt Beranek and Newman's TENEX system for
plex.
In
an
experiment
by Howden, path analythe PDP-10. The main contribution of the study was
sis
revealed
the
existence
of one out of three path
a classification of integrity flaws found in the operatselection
errors
[18].
ing systems studied.
Input validation Errors: These errors result when
a functional module fails to properly validate the
input it accepts from another module or another
process. Failure to validate the input may cause

The fault categories proposed in the RISaS project
are general enough to classify faults from several operating systems, but the generality of the fault cate-
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the module accepting input to fail or it may indirectly cause another interacting module to fail.

can also be applied to sections of the code to
ensure that all possible inputs are examined.

Syntax testing can be used to verify that functional modules that accept input from other processes or modules do not fail when presented
with ill-formatted input.

Synchronization Errors: These are introduced
because of the existence of a timing window between two operations or faults that result from
improper or inadequate serialization of operations. One possible sequence of actions that may
lead to a synchronization fault can be characterized as [22):

Path analysis and testing can be applied to detect scenarios where a certain execution path
may be chosen based on the input. In an experiment conducted by Howden, path testing revealed the existence of nine out of twelve computation errors.

1. A process acquires access to an object to
perform some operation.
2. The process's notion of the object changes
indirectly.
3. The process performs the operation on the
object.

Access Validation Errors: Path analysis can be
used to detect errors that result from incorrectly
specified condition constructs. Branch and Relational Operator testing (BRO) is a test case
design techniques that can aid in the design of
test cases that can expose access validation errors.
Failure to Handle Exceptional Condition Errors:
A security breach can be caused if a system fails
to handle an exceptional condition. This can
include unanticipated return codes, and failure
events.
Static analysis techniques such as inspection of
design documents, code walk-throughs, and formal verification of critical sections can be used to
ensure that a system can gracefully handle any
unanticipated event. Path analysis testing can
also be performed on small critical sections of
code to ensure that all possible execution paths
are examined. This can reveal problems that
may not have been anticipated by the designers
or overlooked because of complexity.

Mutation testing can be used to detect synchronization faults in a program. To detect faults
that are introduced by a timing window between two operations, a trap..on_execution mutant can be placed between these two operations.
The mutant terminates execution of the program
if certain specified conditions are not satisfied.
For instance, a liming window between the access permission checks and the actual logging in
xterm could be exploited to compromise security [3]. A mutant for this vulnerability could be
designed that terminated execution thus killing
the mutant, if the access checks had been completed. This mutant could be placed between the
access checks and the logging to detect the race
condition.
Mutants can also be designed to detect improper
serialization operations. Consider a set of n
statement that must be executed sequentially to
ensure correct operation. We assume that the
statements do not contain any instructions that
break the sequential lock-step execution. We can
design (n! - 1) mutants that rearrange the order
of the n execution statements. These mutants
are killed when the mutated program produces
a different result than the original program.

Environment Errors: These errors are dependent
on the operational environment, which makes
them difficult. to detect [31]. It is possible that
these vulnerabilities manifest themselves only
when the software is run on a particular machine, under a particular operating system, or
a particular configuration.

Configuration Errors: These may result when
software is adapted to new environments or from
a failure to adhere to the security policy. Configuration errors consist of faults introduced after
software has been developed a.nd are faults introduced during the maintenance phase of the
software life-cycle.

Spafford [31J used mutation testing to uncover
problems with integer overflow and underflow.
Mutation testing can be used to design test cases
that exercise a specific set of inputs unique to the
run-time environment. Path analysis and testing
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A static audit analysis of a system can reveal a
majorit.y of configuration errors. Among the various software testing techniques discussed, static
analysis is the most effective in detecting configuration errors. The static audit of a system can
be automated by using static audit tools such as
CoPs [15] and Tiger [29] that search a system
for known avenues of penetration.

• Synchronization errors.
• Condition validation errors.
Emergent Faults
• Configuration errors.
• Environment faults.

3.1
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Fault Classification Scheme

Synchronization Errors

In our taxonomy a fault classifies as a synchronization
error if:

From the work presented in the previous section, and
• A fault can be exploited because of a timing winfrom our experience working with security faults, we
dow between two operations.
developed a taxonomy of security faults that is more
• A fault results from improper serialization of opappropriate for data organization. We broadly claserations.
sify faults as either coding faults or emergent faults.
Although personnel, communication, physical, and
For example, a vulnerability was found in many
operations security also play an essential role in the
versions
of the xterm program which, if exploited, alreliable operation of computer systems, we focus on
lowed
users
to create and delete arbitrary files in the
faults that are embodied in the software.
system. If xterm operated as a setuid or setgid process, then a race condition between the access check
Coding faults are comprised of faults that were in~
permissions to the logging file and the logging itself
troduced during software development. These
allowed users to replace any arbitrary file with the
faults could have been introduced because of erlogging file [3]. The following code illustrates how
rors in programming logic, missing or incorrect. the vulnerability would be exploited.
requirements, or design errors [28, 32, 27, 9, 20].
Emergent faults result from improper installation
- of software, unexpected integration incompatibilities, and when when a programmer fails
to completely understand the limitations of the
run-time modules. Emergent faults are essentially those where the software performs exactly
according to specification, but still causes a fault.
Most policy errors can be classified as emergent
faults, as can be modular sofware where each
module works perfectly but the integrated product does not.

# create a FIFO file and name it foo
mknod faa p
# start logging to faa

xterm -If faa
# rename file faa to junk
mv faa junk

# create a symbolic link to
In -s /etc/pass~d faa
# open other end of FIFO
cat junk

pass~ord

file

This error occurs because of a timing window that
exists between the time access permissions of the logging file are checked and the time actual logging is
started. This timing window could be exploited by
creating a symbolic link from the logging file to a target file in the system. As xterm runs setuid root, this
could be used to create new files or destroy existing
files in the system.

For classification purposes, we abstract each implementation error to a level that will maintain the
specific characteristics yet hide the implementation
details. This approach is beneficial when classifying
faults from more than one programming language.
Our taxonomy of faults is comprised of the following categories:
Coding Faults
4

3.2

Condition Validation Errors

• Field-value correlation.
• Syntax.
• Type and number of parameters or input
fields.
• Missing input fields or delimiters.
• Extraneous input fields or parameters.

Conditions are usually specified as a conditional construct in the implementation language. An expression corresponding to the condition is evaluated and
an execution path is chosen based on the outcome of
the condition. In this discussion, we assume that an
operation is allowed to proceed only if the condition
evaluated to true. A condition validation error occurs
if:

Failure to properly validate input may indirectly
cause other functional modules to fail and cause
the system to behave in an unexpected manner.
Check for the origin of a subject. In this context, subject refers to a user/process, host, and
shared data objects. The system must authenticate the subject's identity to prevent against
identity compromise attacks.

• A condition is missing. This allows an operation to proceed regardless of the outcome of the
condition expression.
• A condition is incorrectly specified. Execution of
the program would proceed along an alternate
path, allowing an operation to proceed regardless of the outcome of the condition expression,
completely invalidating the check.
• A predicate in the condition expression is miss-.
ing. This would evaluate the condition incorrectly and allow the alternate execution path to
be chosen.

In Unix, letelexports specifies a lists of trusted
remote hosts that are allowed to mount the file system. In SunOS 4.l.x, if 8. host entry in the file was
longer than 256 characters, or if the number of hosts
exceeded the cache capacity, a buffer overflow allowed
any non-trusted host to mount the file system [4].
This allowed unauthorized users read and write access
to all files on a system. This error occurred because
the system failed to check that it had read more than
256 characters or that it had exhausted the cache capacity.

Condition errors are coding faults that occur because a programmer misunderstood the requirements
or made a logic error when the condition was specified.

Another example is the uux utility in Unix. This
In our taxonomy, a fault classifies as a condition
utility
allows users to remotely execute a limited set
error if one of the following conditions is missing or
of
commands.
A flaw in the parsing of the command
not specified correctly:
line allowed remote users to execute arbitrary commands on the system [11]. The command line to
Check for limits. Before an operation can proceed, be executed was received by the remote system, and
the system must. ensure that it can allocate the parsed to see if the commands in the line were among
required resources without causing starvation or the set of commands that could be executed. uux read
deadlocks. For input/output operations, the sys- the first word of the line, and skipped characters untem must also ensure that a user/process does til a delimiter character (;, ~, I) was read. uux would
not read or write beyond its address boundaries. continue this way until the end of the line was read.
Check for access rights. The system must ensure However, two delimiters (&, ') were missing from the
set, so a command following these characters would
that a user/process can only access an object
never be checked before being executed. For examin its access domain. The mechanics of this
ple, a user could execute any command by executing
check would differ among different systems dethe following sequence.
pending on how access control mechanisms are
implemented.
Check for valid input. Any routines that accept uux remote_machine ! rmail anything t command
input directly from a user or from another routine must check for the validity of input. This
In uux the command after the ".t" character would
includes checks for:
not be checked before being executed. This allowed
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users to execute unauthorized commands on a remote as an argument to the shell interpreter that started an
system. This error occurred because uux failed to interactive shell. Both the exec system call and the
check for the missing delimiters.
shell interpreter worked according to specifications.
The error resulted from an interaction between the
shell interpreter and the exec call that had not been
considered.
3.3 Configuration Errors
The configuration of a system consists of the software
and hardware resources. In our taxonomy, a fault can
be classified as a configuration error if:
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Selection Criteria

• A program/utility is installed in the wrong place. For each of the classifications described in our taxon• A program/utility is installed with incorrect omy, it should be possible to design a decision process
that would help us classify faults automatically and
setup parameters.
unambigously. Many such decision processes are pos• A secondary storage object or program is insible and we present a selection criteria that can be
stalled with incorrect permissions.
used to classify security faults into different categories
For example, at some sites the tttp daemon was to distinctly classify each fault.
enabled in such a way that it allowed any user on
the Internet to access any file on the machine running tftp. This Raw qualifies as a configuration error in our taxonomy because tftp was not properly
installed. tftp should have been enabled such that
access to the file system was restricted via the chroot
command [1, 2].

For each fault category we present a series of questions that are used to determine membership in a
specific category. An affirmative answer to a question in that series qualifies the fault to be classified
in the corresponding category.

4.1
3.4

Environment Faults

Condition Validation Errors

The following sets of questions can be used to determine if a fault can be classified as a condition validation error.

Environment faults are introduced when specifications are translated to code but sufficient attention
is not paid to the run-time environment. Environmental faults can also occur when different modules
interact in an unanticipated manner. Independently
the modules may function according to specifications
but an error occurs when they are subjected to a
specific set of inputs in a particular configuration environment.

Boundary Condition Errors
• Did the error occur when a process attempted to read or write beyond a valid
address boundary?
• Did the error occur when a system resource
was exhausted?
• Did the error result from an overHow of a
static-sized data structure?

For example, the exec system call overlays a new
process image over an old one. The new image is
constructed from an executable object file or a data
file containing commands for an interpreter. When
an interpreter file is executed, the arguments specified
in the exec call are passed to the interpreter. Most
interpreters take "-i" as an argument to start an
interactive shell.

Access Validation Errors
• Did the error occur when a subject invoked
an operation on an object outside its access
domain?
• Did the error occur as a result of reading
or writing to/from a file or device outside a
subject's access domain?

In SunOS version 3.2 and earlier, any user could
create an interactive shell by creating a link with the
name "-i" to a setuid shell script. exec passed "-i"

Origin Validation Errors
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4.3

• Did the error result when an object accepted input from an unauthorized subject?
• Did the error result because the system
failed to properly or completely authenti·
cate a subject?

Environment Errors

This section presents a series of questions that be
used to decide if a fault can he classified as an environment error.

Input Validation Errors

• Does the error result from an interaction in a
specific environment between functionally correct modules?
• Does the error occur only when a program is executed on a specific machine, under a particular
configuration?
• Does the error occur because the operational environment is different from what the software
was designed for?

• Did the error occur because a program
failed to recognize syntactically incorrect
input?
• Did the error result when a module accepted extraneous input fields?
• Did the error result when a module did not
handle missing input fields?
• Did the error result because of a field-value
correlation error?

4.4

Failure to Handle Exceptional Conditions

Configuration Errors

• Did the error manifest itself because the
system failed to handle an exceptional con· The following questions can be used to determine if
dition, generated by a functional module, a fault can be classified as a configuration error.
device, or user input?
• Did the error result because a system utility was
installed with incorrect setup parameters?
• Did the error occur by exploiting a system utility
4.2 Synchronization Errors
that was installed in the wrong place?
•
Did
the error occur because access permissions
This section presents the criteria that can be used to
were
incorrectly set on a utility such that it viodecide if a fault can be classified as a synchronization
lated
the security policy?
error.
Race Condition Errors
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• Is the error exploited during a timing win"
dow between two operations?
Serialization Errors

Applications of Fault Taxonomy

In this section, we present some applications of our
fault classification scheme. In addition, we also identified some testing techniques that may be used to
systematically detect those faults.

• Did the error result from inadequate or improper serialization of operations?
Atomicity Errors

• Did the error occur when partially-modified
data structures were observed by another 5.1 Vulnerability Database
process?
• Did the error occur because the code ter- Landwehr et a1.[24] observe that the history of soft·
minated with data only partially modified ware failure has heen mostly undocumented and
as part of some operation that should have knowing how systems have failed can help us design
better systems that are less prone to failure. The debeen atomic?
sign of a vulnerability database is one step in that
direction.

7

The database could serve as a repository ofvulnerability informal.ion collected from different sources,
could be organized to allow useful queries to be performed on the data, and could provide useful information to system designers in identifying areas of weaknesses in the design, requirements, or implementation of software. The database could also be used to
maintain vendor patch information, vendor and response team advisories, and catalog the patches applied in response to those advisories. This information would be helpful to system administrators maintaining legacy systems.

be extended with more vulnerabilities. The database
currently has over 80 significant faults, largely from
variants of the UNIX operating system. We have
data to extend the collection to almost 150 cataloged
faults. Once this is complete, we intend to evaluate
the structure and use of the database for some of our
original research goals: building static audit tools,
guiding software design and testing, and enhancing
incident response capabilities.

7

Taimur Aslam designed and built a prototype vulnerability database (8] to explore the usefulness of
the classification scheme presented in this paper. Our
vulnerability database is based on a relational schema
model that consists of both physical and conceptual
entities. These entities are represented as relations
(tables) in the model. Relational algebra defines the
operations that can be performed on the the relations.
It also defines a set of basis functions such that any
query in the relational model can be specified only
in terms of these functions. The basis functions in
the relational model are: SELECT, PROJECT, UNION,
DIFFERENCE, and CARTESIAN PRODUCT.

In this paper we presented a fault classification
scheme that helps in the unambiguous classification
of security faults that is suitable for data organization and processing. A database of vulnerabilities
using this classification was implemented and is being used to aid in the production of tools that detect
and prevent computer break-ins. The classification
scheme has contributed to the understanding of computer security faults that cause security breaches.

The database was populated with vulnerability information from several sources and proved a useful
resource in the development of intrusion detection
patterns for the COAST intrusion detection system
IDIOT [22, 23, 21].
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Conclusion

Future Work

It needs to be determined whether our classification
scheme needs to be enhanced to encompass other operating systems. Many modern systems are based on
a software architecture that is different from that of
Unix. These include micro-kernels, object-oriented,
and distributed operating systems. If needed, our
classification scheme can be easily expanded becallSe
the criteria used for the taxonomy does not rely on
implementation details and is designed to encompass
general characteristics of a fault. Also, our existing
categories can be extended to include any news faults
that cannot be classified into the existing categories,
should any be found.
The COAST vulnerability database also needs to
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